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Abstract—To encourage collaboration among single intru-
sion detection systems (IDSs), collaborative intrusion detection
networks (CIDNs) have been developed that enable different
IDS nodes to communicate information with each other. This
distributed network infrastructure aims to improve the detec-
tion performance of a single IDS, but may suffer from various
insider attacks like collusion attacks, where several malicious
nodes can collaborate to perform adversary actions. To defend
against insider threats, challenge-based trust mechanisms have
been proposed in the literature and proven to be robust against
collusion attacks. However, we identify that such mechanisms
depend heavily on an assumption of malicious nodes, which is
not likely to be realistic and may lead to a weak threat model in
practical scenarios. In this paper, we analyze the robustness of
challenge-based CIDNs in real-world applications and present
an advanced collusion attack, called random poisoning attack,
which derives from the existing attacks. In the evaluation, we
investigate the attack performance in both simulated and real
CIDN environments. Experimental results demonstrate that
our attack can enables a malicious node to send untruthful
information without decreasing its trust value at large. Our
research attempts to stimulate more research in designing more
robust CIDN framework in practice.
Keywords-Collaborative Intrusion Detection, Insider Attack,
Distributed Network, Collusion Attack, Network Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
As current information infrastructure is vulnerable to vari-
ous intrusions, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are widely
deployed to protect such resources by identifying malicious
actions. Generally, these systems can be classified into two
categories based on their detection approaches: misuse-based
detection and anomaly-based detection [19]. In particular, a
misuse-based IDS detects an intrusion through specifying
known signatures of attacks and comparing incoming files
to find any match. An anomaly-based IDS detects a potential
attack by comparing current behavior with the pre-defined
normal behavior (or patterns).
With the rapid evolution of adversary techniques, it is
known that a traditional and single IDS, which operates
in isolation, is very likely to be compromised by complex
Author Note: Weizhi Meng is previously known as Yuxin Meng.
or zero-day attacks. To address this issue, collaborative in-
trusion detection networks (CIDNs) are developed enabling
IDS nodes to exchange information with each other [22].
However, in such collaborative environments, a malicious
(or malfunctioning) IDS node can make a negative impact
on the network performance and degrade alarm aggregation
by sending out false intrusion assessments [4]. As a result, it
is very important for CIDNs to evaluate the trustworthiness
of joined IDS nodes and identify malicious nodes.
Motivations. In the literature, many efforts have been
made aiming to protect CIDNs from insider threats (see
Section V). Amongst these, challenge-based trust mecha-
nisms (or challenged-based CIDNs) are one effective solu-
tion [4, 11]. This mechanism evaluates the trustworthiness of
a node based on the received answers to the corresponding
challenges. A series of studies have proven that challenge-
based CIDNs are robust to common insider attacks such as
collusion attacks, where a set of malicious nodes cooper-
ate together by providing false alert rankings in order to
compromise the network [5, 7]. However, such mechanism
assumes that malicious nodes always send feedback opposite
to its truthful judgment. In practice, we are aware of that
this assumption may be not realistic and can only handle
collusion attacks in a weak threat model.
Contributions. As stated above, challenge-based CIDNs
are able to defend against collusion attacks under the as-
sumption. But in real-world applications of CIDNs, it is hard
to ensure that malicious nodes always send feedback oppo-
site to its truthful judgment. Intuitively, even a malicious
node can send truthful feedback pretending to be a benign
node. For simplicity, we coin the collusion attacks which are
assumed under the assumption to naive collusion attacks. In
this work, we introduce an advanced collusion attack that is
practical in real-world networks and evaluate its impact on
challenge-based trust mechanism. The contributions of this
work can be summarized as follows.
• We first analyze the feasibility of the assumptions used
by the existing challenge-based trust mechanisms [4, 7]
and point out that this assumption of malicious nodes
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Figure 1. The high-level architecture of challenge-based CIDNs and the major components of a node.
is not realistic in practical implementations. We then
develop an advanced collusion attack, called random
poisoning attack, which improves the naive collusion
attack, in which malicious nodes can choose to send
back untruthful feedback in a random manner.
• In the evaluation, we firstly investigate the attack fea-
sibility under a simulated CIDN environment and then
explore its performance in a real network environment.
Experimental results demonstrate that our attack is
effective in practice, where malicious nodes can send
false alarm ranking without loosing their trust values at
large and keep an impact on alarm aggregation.
To clarify the scope of this paper, we adopt the basic
CIDN framework from the literature [7] and limit our discus-
sions to the attack performance. We advocate that challenge-
based trust mechanism is an important means to protect
CIDNs. Thus, our effort aims to stimulate more research in
enhancing existing CIDN architectures and designing more
robust CIDN frameworks and trust mechanisms to defend
against insider attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we introduce the background of challenge-based
CIDNs. Section III analyzes the feasibility of assumptions
made by the challenge-based trust mechanism and describes
our developed random poisoning attack in detail. In Sec-
tion IV, we investigate the attack performance under both
simulated and real network environments. Then, we review
related work in Section V and conclude the work with future
directions in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND OF CHALLENGE-BASED
COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION NETWORKS
Generally, challenge-based CIDNs refer to those networks
which employ a challenge-based trust mechanism. For better
understanding, in this section, we introduce the basic CIDN
framework proposed by [4, 5] including major components
and the relevant challenge-response mechanism. In Figure 1,
we describe the high-level architecture of challenge-based
CIDNs and the major components of a node.
In particular, Figure 1 (a) shows how to join the network
for a new node and the interactions under the challenge-
based trust mechanism.
• Partner list. According to [4, 5, 7], an IDS node in the
CIDN can choose its collaborators according to its own
experience. These nodes are associated if they have a
collaborative and cooperative relationship. Each node
can maintain a list of their collaborated nodes. Such
list can be called as partner list (or acquaintance list).
This list is customizable and contains public keys of
other nodes and their current trust values.
• Network join. To join the CIDN, a node should first
register to a trusted certificate authority (CA) and get
its unique proof of identity (including a public key and
a private key). Then, it can ask for joining the network.
As shown in Figure 1 (a), if node C wants to join the
CIDN, it has to send an application to a CIDN node,
say node A. After certificate authentication, node A can
send back the decision. If accepted, node C can get an
initial list of collaborated nodes from node A.
• Messages. In such collaborative network, a node is
able to request information from other nodes (i.e.,
requesting alarm ranking for alarm aggregation). In
order to defend against insider attacks, there is another
type of messages, called challenge, which contains a list
of alarms for labeling severity. As a result, there are two
types of messages can be sent within a challenge-based
CIDN: a request for alarm aggregation and a challenge
for evaluating nodes’ trustworthiness.
Figure 1 (b) presents the major components of a CIDN
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node including IDS, trust management component, collabo-
ration component, and P2P communication component.
• Trust management component. This component is built
to evaluate the trustworthiness of other CIDN nodes.
According to [4–6], the trustworthiness of a node is
mainly computed by evaluating the received feedback.
It is worth noting that the testing node should know
the correct answers, i.e., severity of the alert described
in a challenge, so that it can use the received feedback
to compute a trust value for the tested node. As stated
above, each node can send out requests or challenges
for alert ranking (consultation). To defend against insid-
er attacks, challenges should be sent out randomly and
in a way that makes them difficult to be distinguished
from requests [4, 5].
• Collaboration component. This component is an inter-
face to send out requests or challenges, and receiving
the relevant feedback. If an IDS node receives a request
or challenge, this component can help send back its
feedback as the answers. As depicted in Figure 1 (a),
if node A sends a request/challenge to node B, node
B will send back relevant feedback, respectively.
• P2P communication. This component is responsible
for establishing connections with other IDS nodes and
providing network organization, management and com-
munication between various nodes.
Based on the design, challenge-based CIDNs are capable
of identifying malicious nodes under common insider attacks
like collusion attacks, where a group of malicious peers
cooperate together by providing false alert rankings in order
to compromise the network [4, 5]. Under the challenge-
based trust mechanism, collusion attacks could be uncovered
by means of challenges [5, 11], because they are sent in a
random manner and it will be difficult for malicious nodes
to distinguish them from actual requests.
III. OUR DEVELOPED ATTACK
In this section, we discuss the threat model and relevant
assumptions made by challenge-based trust mechanism and
introduce an advanced collusion attack, random poisoning
attack, which can be used to compromise its robustness.
A. Threat Model and Assumptions
As described earlier, challenges will be sent in a random
manner under the challenge-based CIDNs and a node is
hard to distinguish challenges from requests. These two
conditions can be considered as the first assumption for
challenge-based CIDNs. The main purposes of such design
can be summarized as below:
• The random manner aims to protect challenges, since
malicious nodes cannot predict when they will receive
challenges. As a result, to maintain their trust values,
nodes have to response to each received message.
• To better protect challenges, it is further assumed that
challenges are not easy to be distinguished from mes-
sages. This condition further forces nodes to response
to each received message. Otherwise, malicious nodes
can choose not to response to challenges, but only give
false alarm ranking to requests.
In the attack simulation, existing challenge-based CIDNs
employ a maximal harm model where an adversary always
chooses to report false feedback with the intention to bring
the most negative impact to the request sender. For example,
when a malicious node receives a ranking request, it will
send feedback “no risk” for an alarm whose real risk level
should be “medium”, because this feedback can maximally
deviate the aggregated result at the sender side. To summa-
rize, the second assumption is that malicious nodes always
send feedback opposite to its truthful judgment for chal-
lenges. This assumption is widely accepted in most research
studies and their evaluations such as [4, 5, 7, 10, 11].
In real-world applications, we find that the second as-
sumption is not realistic with the rapid evolution of network
threats. A malicious node can choose more complex strate-
gies to affect the network performance. This assumption thus
may result in a weak threat model and leave challenge-based
CIDNs still vulnerable to advanced insider attacks in real
implementations. Due to this, we coin the collusion attacks
under the above assumption as naive collusion attacks. Next,
we develop and introduce an advanced collusion attack.
B. Advanced Collusion Attack
In this part, we develop and introduce a type of advanced
collusion attack, called random poisoning attack, by im-
proving the above naive collusion attacks. We assume that
a malicious node can choose whether to send malicious
feedback to received messages, which is more realistic in
real computer networks. It is worth noting that challenges
have to be sent in random and under a message rate. As the
number of messages should be bigger than the number of
challenges, the basic idea of our attack is to send malicious
feedback under a rate (possibility), attempting to response
to requests and bypass challenges.
Success possibility. Let Nm denote the total number of
messages sent each day, Nc denote the number of challenges
sent each day, and p denote the possibility of meeting any
challenge in the same day. Therefore, we can compute the
possibility as below:
p = Nc/Nm (1)
According to [4, 5], Nc is fixed to keep scalability and
reduce network congestion. Thus, a larger Nm can decrease
the possibility. In practice, former studies have pointed out
that a large amount of IDS alarms would be produced each
day [13, 16]. That is, Nm is very likely to be high and p
can be rapidly decreased in real network environments. This
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Figure 2. Random poisoning attack on challenge-based CIDNs.
opens a hole for malicious nodes to bypass the examination
of challenge-based trust mechanism.
Random poisoning attack. Taking advantage of the vul-
nerability, we improve naive collusion attacks and describe a
kind of advanced collusion attacks, called random poisoning
attack, where malicious nodes have a capability of sending
malicious feedback (i.e., false alarm ranking) in a random
manner. In other words, for a malicious node, the possibility
of sending out malicious feedback is 1/2.
Figure 2 depicts the process of random poisoning attack.
When receives a message from a testing node, tested node
can choose to send back malicious feedback with a possibili-
ty P = 1/2. In particular scenarios, P can be adjusted (i.e., it
is possible to distinguish a challenge from messages). In this
work, as we have accepted the condition that a node is hard
to distinguish challenges from requests, our attack attempts
to use such random manner to compromise the robustness
of challenge-based CIDNs.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we investigate the performance of random
poisoning attack on challenge-based CIDNs under simulated
and real network environments, respectively.
A. Methodology
In the evaluation, we conducted three experiments includ-
ing two simulations and one real investigation.
• In the first simulation, we aim to explore the perfor-
mance of naive collusion attack under challenge-based
CIDNs, where a dishonest IDS node always sends its
feedback opposite to its truthful judgement.
• In the second simulation, we try to explore the feasi-
bility of random poisoning attack, where a dishonest
IDS node can send its untruthful feedback in a random
manner (with possibility of 1/2).
• In the third experiment, we evaluate the attack perfor-
mance in a real wired CIDN, which is located in an
information center. This experiment aims to explore the
practical performance of random poisoning attack in a
real network scenario.
B. CIDN Settings
There are 20 nodes in the simulated CIDN environment,
which are randomly distributed in a 5×5 grid region. We use
Snort [21] as IDS plugin that can be implemented in a node.
Each IDS node can connect to other nodes and establish an
initial partner list based on the distance. The initial trust
values of all nodes in the partner list are set to Ts = 0.5.
To evaluate the trustworthiness of other partner nodes,
each node can send out challenges randomly to other nodes
with an average rate of ε. There are two levels of request
frequency: εl and εh. For a highly trusted or highly untrusted
node, the request frequency is low, since it should be very
confident about the decision of their feedback. But for other
nodes, the request frequency should be high because their
trust values are close to threshold, thus, we need to monitor
them carefully. All the settings are referred to [5, 6, 11]. It
is worth emphasizing that we set low request frequency to
10 per day, which is higher and more strict than [5, 6]. The
detailed parameters can be summarized in Table I.
Table I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS IN THE EXPERIMENT.
Parameters Value Description
λ 0.9 Forgetting factor
εl 10/day Low request frequency
εh 20/day High request frequency
r 0.8 trust threshold
Ts 0.5 Trust value for new comers
m 10 Lower limit of received feedback
d 0.3 Severity of punishment
Three expertise levels are employed for a node as low
(0.1), medium (0.5) and high (0.95). The expertise of an
IDS can be using a beta function described as below:
f(p′|α, β) = 1
B(α, β)
p′α−1(1− p′)β−1
B(α, β) =
∫ 1
0
tα−1(1− t)β−1dt
(2)
where p′(∈ [0, 1]) is the probability of intrusion examined
by the IDS. f(p′|α, β) means the probability that a node with
expertise level l responses with a value of p′ to an intrusion
examination of difficulty level d(∈ [0, 1]). A higher value
of l means a higher probability of correctly identifying an
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intrusion while a higher value of d means that an intrusion is
more difficult to detect. In particular, α and β can be defined
as [5]:
α = 1 +
l(1− d)
d(1− l)r
β = 1 +
l(1− d)
d(1− l) (1− r)
(3)
where r ∈ {0, 1} is the expected result of detection. For a
fixed difficulty level, the node with higher level of expertise
can achieve higher probability of correctly detecting an
intrusion. For example, a node with expertise level of 1
can accurately identify an intrusion with guarantee if the
difficulty level is 0.
Node Trust Evaluation. To evaluate the trustworthiness
of a target node, a testing node can sent a challenge to the
tested node through a random generation process. The test-
ing node then can compute a score to reflect its satisfaction
level. Based on [4], we can evaluate the trustworthiness of
a node i according to node j as follows:
T ji = (ws
∑n
k=0 F
j,i
k λ
tk∑n
k=0 λ
tk
− Ts)(1− x)d + Ts (4)
where F j,ik ∈ [0, 1] is the score of the received feedback
k and n is the total number of feedback. λ is a forgetting
factor that assigns less weight to older feedback response.
ws is a significant weight depending on the total number of
received feedback, if there is only a few feedback under
a certain minimum m, then ws =
∑n
k=0 λ
tk
m , otherwise
ws = 1. x is the percentage of “don’t know” answers during
a period (e.g., from t0 to tn). d is a positive incentive
parameter to control the severity of punishment to “don’t
know” replies. More details about derivation and feedback
satisfaction calculation can be referred to [4, 5].
C. Experiment-1: Naive Collusion Attack
In this simulation, we conduct an experiment to show the
robustness of challenge-based CIDNs against naive collusion
attack, where a set of dishonest nodes collaborate to send
false alarm ranking and always give feedback opposite to its
truthful judgment. As thousands of alarms can be generated
each day [13, 16], in this simulation, we consider that the
number of requests is much bigger than Nc. As a result, we
set the Nm = 100 in this experiment. The results are shown
in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
Figure 3 presents the convergence of trust values for
nodes with different expertise levels. It is worth noting that
there are three expertise levels: low (I = 0.1), medium
(I = 0.5) and high (I = 0.95). In line with the results
from [4, 5], nodes with higher expertise can achieve bigger
trust values. After around 20 days, the trust of all nodes
started converging to stable values.
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Figure 3. Simulation: convergence of trust values for nodes with different
expertise levels.
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Figure 4. Simulation: trust values of malicious nodes under the naive
collusion attack.
To launch naive collusion attack, as a study, we randomly
choose three expert nodes (I = 0.95) to send untruthful
feedback in a constant way from Day 45. We accordingly
name these nodes as malicious node 1, malicious node 2 and
malicious node 3. Figure 4 shows the trust values of these
malicious nodes during the attack period. It is noticeable that
trust values of these nodes drop quickly below the threshold
of 0.8 and cannot make an impact on alarm aggregation.
Since malicious nodes always send untruthful feedback to
messages including challenges, challenge-based CIDNs can
detect such malicious feedback in a short time. The results
demonstrate that the challenge-based trust mechanism work
well in identifying malicious nodes under the naive collusion
condition.
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Figure 5. Simulation: trust values of malicious nodes under the advanced
collusion attack.
D. Experiment-2: Advanced Collusion Attack
In this experiment, our main goal is to investigate the
feasibility of advanced collusion attack on challenge-based
CIDNs. Similar to the above experiment, we also set Nm =
100 and use the same expert nodes of malicious node 1,
malicious node 2 and malicious node 3 to launch the attack.
The results of trust values are described in Figure 5.
The main observations can be described as follows.
• It is seen that although the trust values of malicious
node 1 and malicious node 2 were decreasing, their
trust values did not fall below the threshold. As a result,
they can still make an impact on alarm aggregation.
• For malicious node 3, its trust value felt below the
threshold during a period from Day 55 to Day 60;
however, its trust value increased over the threshold
again from Day 61 to Day 63. During the attack period,
its trust value always walks around the threshold.
As compared with the results in Figure 4, we find that
our advanced attack can prevent a large decease in trust
values for malicious nodes through randomly sending back
malicious feedback. Even if some malicious answers are
detected, these are not enough to quickly reduce the trust
values to below the threshold at one go. The results demon-
strate the feasibility of our attack.
E. Experiment-3: Random Poisoning Attack in Real Network
Environments
In this experiment, we aim to evaluate the practical attack
performance in a real and wired CIDN environment. More
specifically, this network consists of 25 nodes hosting in an
information center, where the incoming network traffic is
about 1202 packets/s on average weekly. The basic network
settings can be referred to Table I. Differently, as we did not
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Figure 6. Trust values of malicious nodes under random poisoning attack
in a real CIDN.
fix the number of messages Nm, this number may be varied
each day according to the real daily traffic.
Similar to the above experiments, we first wait the whole
network and relevant trust values to be stable. Then, we
randomly select three expert nodes as dishonest nodes to
launch random poisoning attack. The results of trust values
are described in Figure 6. The major observations are
summarized as follows.
• In the real network, it is found that no malicious nodes
can be quickly identified. Actually, none of their trust
values are below the threshold of 0.8, so that all of
them can still join the process of alarm aggregation.
• Some malicious feedback can still be detected and
decrease the trust values of malicious nodes. However,
as these nodes only send untruthful responses in a ran-
dom manner, challenge-based trust mechanism cannot
always identify malicious feedback. Hence it cannot
quickly reduce the trust values of malicious nodes in
a short time. If failed to detect, the trust values of
malicious nodes can be recovered gradually.
Overall, the results demonstrate the effectiveness of our
attack in a real CIDN environment and reveal that challenge-
based trust mechanism should be further improved to handle
more complex insider threats in practice.
F. Discussions
In the evaluation, we have demonstrated the feasibility and
effectiveness of random poisoning attack in compromising
the robustness of challenge-based CIDNs in practice. Actual-
ly, our attack is just one possible form of advanced collusion
attacks in a real network environment. To defend against
such advanced attacks, several potential countermeasures can
be considered as follows.
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• The number of challenges. Increasing the number of
challenges is an intuitive and possible solution, but this
may add more workload on network performance (i.e.,
causing network congestion). Thus, a balance should
be made between challenges and requests.
• Adding other trust levels. As challenges should be sent
under a fixed message rate, it opens a hole for advanced
attackers. To complement this, adding other trust levels
is a promising solution. For example, detecting mali-
cious packets in the network [14].
Overall, our study verifies that advanced attackers may
behavior more complicatedly in real network environments.
Therefore, a realistic threat model should be considered in
designing practical and robust CIDN frameworks.
V. RELATED WORK
Distributed IDS architecture. Distributed network in-
frastructure is very common for IDSs that allows separate
nodes to share and exchange information with each other.
In 2003, Janakiraman and Zhang [8] proposed a distributed
scheme called Indra, that allows sharing information be-
tween trusted peers in a network to safeguard a peer-to-peer
network as a whole against intrusion attempts. Then, Li et
al. [9] pointed out that most distributed intrusion detection
systems (DIDS) relied on centralized fusion, or distributed
fusion with unscalable communication mechanisms. Based
on this, they utilize the emerging decentralized location
and routing infrastructure to construct a new DIDS. Their
experimental results showed that the proposed DIDS could
greatly outperform the traditional hierarchical system when
facing large amounts of diverse intrusion alerts. Several
similar studies can be referred to [1, 3, 15, 17, 20, 23].
Collaborative intrusion detection systems and net-
works. To encourage more collaboration among nodes, col-
laborative intrusion detection systems (CIDS) was proposed
by Wu et al. [22] to enhance the detection capability of
a single IDS. More specifically, CIDS employs multiple
specialized detectors across different layers such as network
layer, kernel layer and application layer. In addition, they
implemented a manager for aggregating the alarms from
the different detectors to provide a combined alarm for an
intrusion. They evaluated the system under a real-world web
based application and three classes of attacks (e.g., buffer
overflow, flooding and script-based attacks). They showed
that CIDS could reduce the impact of missing alarms and
false alarms on the performance.
However, one major issue of CIDS is that it assumes
that all peers are trusted. This issue often occurs in most
distributed IDS architecture, which makes the whole network
vulnerable to insider attacks (i.e., betrayal attacks where
some nodes suddenly become malicious). To defend CIDNs
against insider threats, it requires to establish trust relation-
ship among nodes. For instance, Duma et al. [2] proposed
a P2P-based overlay for intrusion detection (Overlay IDS)
that constructed a trust-aware engine for correlating alerts
and an adaptive scheme for managing trust. The former
engine is able to drop warnings sent by untrusted or low
quality nodes, and the latter scheme could predict nodes’
trustworthiness based on their past experiences. This overlay
network considers how to integrate trust mechanism, but did
not discuss how to handle more complex insider attacks like
collusion attacks.
Challenge-based CIDNs. Following the basic idea from
Duma et al. [2], Fung et al. designed a challenge-based
trust mechanism for CIDNs, in which the trustworthiness
of a node can be computed based on the received answers
to the corresponding challenges. At first, they proposed a
host-based IDS collaboration framework [4] that enabled
each IDS to evaluate the trustworthiness of others based
on its own experience by means of a forgetting factor. The
forgetting factor gave more emphasis on the recent expe-
rience of the peer. Their framework also provided identity
verification and created incentives for collaboration amongst
them. Then, they improved their framework with a Dirichlet-
based model to measure the level of trustworthiness among
IDS nodes according to their mutual experience [5]. This
model had stronger scalability properties and was robust
against common insider threats and the experimental results
demonstrated that the new model could improve robustness
and efficiency.
As feedback aggregation is a key component in the above
trust model, they further applied a Bayesian approach [6] to
feedback aggregation in minimizing the combined costs of
missed detection and false alarms. They indicated that the
Bayesian approach could make an improvement in the true
positive detection rate and a reduction in the average cost.
They laster summarized their approaches and framework [7].
By adopting their basic CIDN framework, Li et al. [10–12]
discusses how to further improve the detection capability
through the use of a parameter, called intrusion sensitivity,
which measures the different expertise of nodes in detecting
particular intrusions.
As challenge-based CIDN is effective against many com-
mon insider attacks due to its unique design, this work main-
ly focuses on such type of CIDN framework and analyzes
its robustness in real-world applications. We particularly
illustrate an advanced collusion attack that can compromise
its robustness in practice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Challenge-based trust mechanisms have been built in the
literature to protect CIDNs against insider threats like col-
lusion attacks. However, we identify that such mechanisms
rely heavily on the assumption that malicious nodes always
send feedback opposite to its truthful judgment. In this paper,
we point out that this assumption may be not realistic in
practice and result in a weak threat model. We thus design
and introduce an advanced collusion attack, called random
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poisoning attack, where a malicious node has the capability
of sending back malicious feedback in a random manner.
In the evaluation, our results under both simulated and real
network environments demonstrate that our attack enables
a malicious node to send untruthful information without
decreasing its trust value at large. Our efforts aim to stimu-
late more research in designing robust trust mechanisms to
defend CIDNs against insider attacks in real scenarios.
Future work includes developing other advanced collusion
attacks on challenge-based trust mechanism and enhancing
existing challenge-based CIDN framework (i.e., adding other
trust levels [14]).
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